
CERT-In issued a warning to users of WhatsApp Desktop and WhatsApp Web about a large-scale malware distribution campaign. In it, threat actors use previously compromised WhatsApp accounts to send malicious Visual Basic Script (.vbs) files to those accounts' existing contacts. Because the file arrives from a known person, the recipient is more likely to open it. CERT-In's note was prepared from findings published by Kaspersky and its Securelist research team in June 2026.
This file sets out the infection chain as published, why it matters for Indian users and businesses, the applicable legal sections, and a triage guide for first responders and cyber cells.
| Stage | What happens | Where to look |
|---|---|---|
| Delivery | A .vbs attachment is sent by direct message from a compromised WhatsApp account to its contacts | WhatsApp chat, Downloads folder |
| Lure | File names imitate invoices, bank or account statements, payment records and debt notices; localised into English, Portuguese, French, German and Malay | File name, chat context |
| Stage 1 | Script creates a working directory under C:\Users\Public\Documents\ and retrieves more script files from external infrastructure | Public Documents folder; proxy/DNS logs |
| Stage 2 | Retrieved scripts run via Windows Script Host and download a compressed archive | Process creation logs for wscript.exe / cscript.exe |
| Payload | Archive contains an installer for legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) software, enabling remote access | Installed programs, services, new remote-access agents |
| Evasion | Scripts carry comments and metadata imitating Microsoft Windows Update components | Script content review |
Geography: Kaspersky reported the highest number of observed victims in Malaysia, with activity also seen in Brazil, Singapore, Taiwan and Vietnam. Kaspersky's release does not name India; CERT-In's warning is a precaution for Indian users of the affected platforms. No victim count for India has been published in the sources reviewed.
The final payload is not custom malware but legitimate remote-administration software. Kaspersky noted it provides "standard administrative capabilities intended for legitimate IT support."
Analysis: This has three consequences for investigators. First, antivirus may not flag the payload, because the software itself is legitimate. Second, the attacker's access looks like IT support traffic in network logs. Third, the RMM vendor holds account and connection records, which makes the vendor a potential source of evidence via a notice under S.94 BNSS.
CERT-In's reporting lists the possible results of a successful infection as remote access to the device, credential theft for fraud, deployment of further malware, infection of the network the user is connected to, and business disruption and financial loss.
.vbs .vbe .exe .bat .cmd .js .ps1 — unless their legitimacy is independently verified (Kaspersky).| # | Step | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Isolate the computer from the network (unplug or disable Wi-Fi); do not power off if live memory capture is planned | Cut the remote session; preserve volatile evidence |
| 2 | Photograph or export the WhatsApp chat showing the sender, time and file name; do not delete the message | Establish the delivery event |
| 3 | Preserve the .vbs file and hash it (SHA-256) before any analysis | Integrity for S.63 BSA certification |
| 4 | Check C:\Users\Public\Documents\, recently installed programs, services and scheduled tasks for remote-access software | Identify the RMM payload |
| 5 | Pull Windows event logs (process creation, service installs) and browser/proxy logs for the infection window | Reconstruct the chain and the infrastructure contacted |
| 6 | Change passwords for email, banking and WhatsApp from a separate clean device; enable two-step verification on WhatsApp | Stop onward misuse |
| 7 | Inform the contact who "sent" the file — their account is likely compromised and they need to secure it | Break the propagation chain |
| 8 | Report at cybercrime.gov.in or call 1930 if money or data was lost; organisations report to CERT-In within 6 hours | Legal and regulatory compliance |
| Provision | Application |
|---|---|
| S.43 / S.66 IT Act 2000 | Introducing a computer contaminant and gaining unauthorised access to the victim's computer |
| S.66C IT Act 2000 | Fraudulent use of the victim's passwords or credentials stolen after infection |
| S.66D IT Act 2000 | Cheating by personation using a computer resource — sending the file while posing as the trusted contact |
| S.318 BNS 2023 | Cheating, where the intrusion leads to financial loss |
| S.319 BNS 2023 | Cheating by personation |
| S.94 BNSS 2023 | Notice to produce records — RMM vendor account data, WhatsApp subscriber data via the platform's law enforcement channel |
| S.63 BSA 2023 | Certificate for electronic records — chat exports, the script file, event logs |
| CERT-In Directions (28 April 2022) | Organisations must report such incidents to CERT-In within 6 hours of noticing |
Facts in this file are drawn from the public reporting below. Where this file goes beyond the sources, the text is marked as analysis or inference.