
India's most persistent mobile fraud does not need a zero-day. It needs one tap on an attachment that looks routine: a wedding invitation, a traffic e-challan, a subsidy notice or a KYC reminder — delivered on WhatsApp, often from a contact the victim trusts, and packaged as an Android app (APK). Police cyber units in Maharashtra and Himachal Pradesh have issued repeated warnings, and researchers have documented the malware behind them.
One rule stops most of it: genuine wedding cards are shared as images or PDFs, and genuine e-challans are checked on official portals. An invitation or a challan never needs you to install an app.
| Wedding invitation lure | RTO / e-challan lure | |
|---|---|---|
| Message | “You're invited” with an APK named like an invitation | Fake traffic-violation alert with challan number, date and vehicle details |
| Channels | WhatsApp, Telegram, Instagram | WhatsApp, from varying numbers |
| Documented payload | SpyMax-type RAT variants (Broadcom, via Cyber Security News) | Two-stage dropper with hidden payload (CYFIRMA) |
| Stolen | SMS, OTPs, contacts, call logs, keystrokes | Aadhaar, PAN, DOB, SMS/OTPs, card number, CVV, ATM PIN, net-banking and UPI credentials |
| Spread | Forwards itself to the victim's contacts (Himachal Police) | Access to WhatsApp and device (Himachal State CID) |
| Indicator | Type |
|---|---|
RTO Challan_v10.0.apk (2.49 MB) | File name |
com.ixstqn.android | Package name |
22cf70a0dd866a4f5addd5d339fad3894a4ebb3e97d597fd7dac9b08899052fb | SHA-256 (main payload) |
9209fc088cdcd7da0161cabf5b9384c2ca790214413ffb437452bcc865c58452 | SHA-256 (dropper) |
0d299aea599b041ab6a532a778505bab | MD5 |
jsonserv[.]xyz, jsonserv[.]biz | C2 domains |
Analysis: The same jsonserv C2 domains appear in CYFIRMA's April 2026 report on KYCShadow, which CYFIRMA linked with moderate-to-high confidence to an earlier e-challan operation. For investigators this suggests these lures may be one infrastructure changing costumes — worth correlating complaints across “challan”, “KYC” and “invite” cases rather than treating them separately.
| # | Action |
|---|---|
| 1 | Call the bank and 1930; block cards, net banking and UPI |
| 2 | Airplane mode; do not factory-reset before evidence is preserved |
| 3 | Settings → Apps (all): note unknown or icon-less apps and package names; check Accessibility and VPN profiles |
| 4 | Dial ##002# to cancel all call forwarding (or check forwarding in call settings) |
| 5 | Preserve the WhatsApp message, sender number and APK; hash the APK (SHA-256) |
| 6 | Change passwords from a clean device; enable two-step verification on WhatsApp |
| 7 | Warn contacts — the app may already have forwarded itself |
| Provision | Application |
|---|---|
| S.43 / S.66 IT Act 2000 | Introducing a contaminant; unauthorised access and data theft |
| S.66C IT Act 2000 | Fraudulent use of OTPs, PINs and credentials |
| S.66D IT Act 2000 | Cheating by personation using a computer resource — posing as RTO, police or the inviting family |
| S.318 / S.319 BNS 2023 | Cheating; cheating by personation |
| S.94 BNSS 2023 | Notices to banks, PSPs, telecom operators, WhatsApp and hosting providers |
| S.63 BSA 2023 | Certificate for the APK, extraction reports and chat exports |
This section describes the publisher's own company. Disclosure: IGRS is written and maintained by Manuj Kumar Pandey, founder of Dunime Technologies.
| Need | Dunime offering |
|---|---|
| Take apart a seized APK: dropper chain, permissions, C2, OTP interception | Shodhan — AI-driven forensic analysis of Android and iOS apps with structured, investigator-ready reports |
| Check whether a victim's phone is still compromised | Yantrix — mobile compromise detection ending in a signed Device Integrity Certificate |
| Further reading | Dunime's own field note: “The invitation is an APK” |
Facts in this file are drawn from the public reporting below. Where this file goes beyond the sources, the text is marked as analysis or inference.