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Anonymized · Educational · India Context · IGRS 2026

> OSINT INVESTIGATION CASE STUDIES_

Anonymized real-world OSINT investigation walkthroughs from the field. All identifying information has been modified to protect ongoing investigations and victim privacy. Published for educational and professional development purposes.

⚠ All cases are anonymized composites. Names, locations, amounts, and identifiers have been changed. These represent methodology demonstrations, not specific ongoing investigations.
Case Study IGRS-CS-001 · Financial Crime · 2025
Tracing a Rs 47 Lakh UPI Fraud Ring Using Only Open Sources
India Financial Fraud Tools: NPCI Portal, MCA21, Truecaller, Maltego, OSINT
Background
A manufacturing company in Pune reported a Rs 47 lakh fraud. A fraudster posing as the company's regular vendor called the accounts manager, claiming a change in bank account due to "GST audit." The manager initiated four NEFT transfers over two days before the real vendor called asking about delayed payment. By the time the complaint was registered at the local cyber cell, 36 hours had elapsed.
Investigation Timeline
Hour 0
Complaint received. UTR numbers for all four NEFT transfers obtained from company's bank statement. 1930 call made — accounts flagged but funds had already moved.
Hour 2
Section 94 BNSS notice to recipient bank. Account found to be opened 3 days before the first transfer — classic mule account indicator. KYC linked to a young man in Bihar with no employment.
Hour 8
NPCI transaction graph requested. Funds had moved through 3 hops in 6 hours: Bihar mule → Gujarat account → Two crypto exchange deposits. Rs 12 lakh still in the Gujarat account — frozen.
Day 2
Crypto exchange (Indian) responded to Section 94 BNSS notice: KYC linked to mobile number. Truecaller identified the name. MCA21 search revealed the name was director of a shell company registered 8 months prior with no filings.
Day 3
Phone number OSINT: same number used to register on a freelance platform under a different name. Profile picture reverse-searched on Yandex — matched a stolen photo from a social media profile in another state.
Day 5
OSINT correlated with call records (Section 92 BNSS) from the phone number used to contact the accounts manager. Tower location data placed suspect in Rajasthan at time of calls — different from claimed address in Bihar.
Day 9
Physical arrest made in Rajasthan. Device forensics revealed 23 other companies contacted using the same script. Total fraud identified: Rs 3.2 crore across 11 victims.
OSINT Tools and Techniques Used
UTR TracingNPCI Legal ProcessMCA21 Director SearchTruecallerYandex Reverse ImageSection 94 BNSS NoticesCrypto Exchange KYCCDR Analysis
✓ Outcome
Rs 12 lakh recovered and returned to victim. Suspect arrested and charged under Sections 318, 319 BNS 2023 and Section 66D IT Act. Two mule account operators arrested separately. Case led to identification of a fraud network operating across 4 states.
📚 Key Learning
The 36-hour delay in reporting significantly reduced recovery. The 1930 freeze was still partially effective. OSINT cross-referencing — phone number across multiple platforms, reverse image search, MCA21 shell company pattern — built the attribution chain without requiring any privileged access. Every data point came from public sources.
Case Study IGRS-CS-002 · Corporate Security · 2025
Mapping a Fake Job Scam Network Targeting Indian IT Graduates
India Job Fraud Tools: LinkedIn OSINT, Sherlock, WHOIS, Email Headers
Background
A large Indian IT company's HR team reported that candidates were receiving fake offer letters on their letterhead. Three candidates had paid "background verification fees" ranging from Rs 8,000 to Rs 25,000 before discovering the fraud. The HR team wanted to understand the full scale of the operation.
Investigation Methodology
Stage 1
Email header analysis of fake offer letters. "From" address spoofed to look like company domain, but SPF/DKIM failed. Originating IP traced to a bulletproof hosting provider in Eastern Europe through WHOIS and AbuseIPDB.
Stage 2
The phone number on the fake offer letter searched via Truecaller: listed as "HR Recruitment." Same number found in 47 job posting sites offering roles at 12 different IT companies. All postings used similar language patterns.
Stage 3
LinkedIn search for the fake "HR manager" name used in the letters. Profile found — created 6 months ago, 12 connections, profile photo reverse-searched: stolen from a genuine LinkedIn user in a different country.
Stage 4
The UPI VPA used for "background verification fees" looked up via GSTIN portal: linked to a proprietorship firm registered in Mumbai with a mismatched address. MCA21 DIN of the proprietor showed two other struck-off companies with similar names.
Stage 5
Sherlock username scan of email prefix used in fake HR contact revealed same username active on dark web forum, Telegram group "Job Seekers Network India" with 14,000 members, and a paste site with "templates" for fake offer letters of 8 companies.
Email Header AnalysisAbuseIPDBTruecallerLinkedIn OSINTYandex Reverse ImageGSTIN LookupMCA21SherlockTelegram OSINT
✓ Outcome
Identified a network of 3 operators using fake HR personas for 12 different IT companies. Intelligence shared with company legal team and I4C. Telegram group reported and removed. Fake LinkedIn profiles reported and suspended. FIR filed — case transferred to cyber cell with complete OSINT dossier.
📚 Key Learning
Fraud operators reuse infrastructure across multiple fake identities. The same phone number, email prefix, and payment UPI appearing across 12 companies indicated a single organized operation rather than independent actors. Pattern recognition across open sources — not any single tool — built the complete picture.
Case Study IGRS-CS-003 · Corporate Due Diligence · 2024
Vendor Due Diligence OSINT That Prevented a Rs 2 Crore Procurement Fraud
India Corporate Intel Tools: MCA21, GST Portal, eCourts, Zauba, LinkedIn OSINT
Background
A mid-sized pharmaceutical company's procurement team was about to release an advance payment of Rs 2 crore to a new chemical supplier before the compliance team requested a quick open-source check. The vendor had presented impressive documentation — company registration, GST certificate, ISO certification — all appearing genuine.
OSINT Findings (48-hour investigation)
Finding 1
MCA21 check: Company incorporated only 4 months prior. Authorized capital: Rs 1 lakh. Paid-up capital: Rs 1 lakh. No charge register entries (meaning no bank loans, which is unusual for a supplier claiming Rs 2 crore business). Filed no annual returns yet.
Finding 2
GST portal: GSTIN active, but business address listed as a residential apartment. Google Maps showed the address as a small flat in a residential colony — not consistent with a chemical trading company needing warehouse facilities.
Finding 3
Director DIN search: The sole director had been a director in two other companies — both struck off for non-compliance within 18 months of incorporation. The pattern: incorporate, collect advances, fail to deliver, dissolve — repeated twice previously.
Finding 4
LinkedIn: No employees at the company found on LinkedIn. The "CEO" listed in company documents had a LinkedIn profile created the same month as company incorporation, with zero mutual connections and a profile photo that Yandex matched to a stock photo website.
Finding 5
Zauba trade data: The company had no import or export records, despite claiming to supply imported chemicals. A genuine chemical trading company would appear in customs data within months of operation.
Finding 6
ISO Certificate verification: The ISO certification number was checked on the issuing body's verification portal — the certificate number was valid but issued to a different company in a different city. The certificate had been modified.
MCA21GST PortalGoogle MapsLinkedIn OSINTYandex Reverse ImageZauba Trade DataISO Verify PortalDIN History
✓ Outcome
Payment blocked before release. Company filed police complaint — investigation revealed the vendor had executed similar advance fraud against 4 other companies in the pharmaceutical sector totaling Rs 8.6 crore. All OSINT findings compiled into a formal report submitted to economic offences wing.
📚 Key Learning
No single red flag was conclusive — it was the combination that built the case. Shell company pattern in DIN history, residential address for industrial activity, stock photo director, zero trade data, and forged ISO certificate together created a compelling fraud picture. Total OSINT cost: zero. Time investment: 8 hours.
Case Study IGRS-CS-004 · Threat Intelligence · 2025
Attributing a Phishing Campaign to a Known Threat Actor Using Infrastructure OSINT
India-Targeted APT / Phishing Tools: URLScan, crt.sh, Shodan, VirusTotal, MITRE ATT&CK
Background
A defence contractor's SOC team flagged an unusual email targeting senior engineers — it contained a link to what appeared to be an internal document portal. The email had passed SPF but failed DMARC. The SOC escalated to the threat intelligence team.
Infrastructure Analysis
Step 1
URLScan.io execution of the phishing URL: page loaded a pixel-perfect clone of the target company's internal portal. Hosting IP: 94.102.49.190. SSL certificate issued to a domain registered 72 hours before the email.
Step 2
crt.sh search for the phishing domain: 3 other certificates issued to the same registrant email within 30 days, each targeting a different Indian defence/aerospace organization.
Step 3
VirusTotal pivot on the hosting IP: 14 other domains pointing to the same IP over 6 months, all following the pattern: [company-name]-[portal/login/secure].com. 7 had been flagged as phishing against Indian organizations.
Step 4
Shodan query on the IP revealed a Go-based HTTP server on port 443 with a distinctive TLS fingerprint (JA3 hash). Searching that JA3 hash on Shodan revealed 23 other servers with the same fingerprint — all hosting similar phishing kits targeting South Asian defence organizations.
Step 5
MITRE ATT&CK correlation: the spearphishing technique (T1566.002), credential harvesting via cloned portal (T1056.003), and infrastructure pattern matched documented TTPs of a threat actor group previously attributed to a nation-state adversary in CERT-In and government advisories.
URLScan.iocrt.shVirusTotalShodan JA3MITRE ATT&CKWHOIS PivotingTLS Fingerprinting
✓ Outcome
23 phishing domains across the actor's infrastructure identified and blocked. IOCs shared with CERT-In and peer organizations via TLP:GREEN. Four other defence organizations protected by proactive block. Attribution intelligence added to threat actor profile used for future hunting.
📚 Key Learning
Infrastructure pivoting — from one phishing domain to IP, from IP to other domains, from TLS fingerprint to the actor's entire server fleet — is the most powerful technique in threat intelligence OSINT. Attackers reuse infrastructure because it is economical. This reuse creates the fingerprints that expose them.

How to Read a Case Study

A case study is most valuable when you read it for transferable method rather than for the specific outcome. As you work through each one, separate the facts of the incident from the investigative decisions: what hypothesis was formed, which sources were used to test it, how fragmented data was correlated into a conclusion, and where the evidence chain was secured for later legal use. Those decisions are what you can carry into your own work.

Pay particular attention to the points where an investigation could have gone wrong — an unverified assumption, a missed source, a break in documentation — because recognising these failure modes is how a method becomes repeatable. Each study here is framed within Indian legal procedure, so the steps shown map onto what a real prosecution in this jurisdiction would require.